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N a t i o n a l  Ae ronau t i cs  and Space A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  
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INTRODUCTION 
T h i s  paper ana lyzes  a NASA Conva i r  990 (CV-990) a c c i d e n t  w i t h  emphasis on  
r e j e c t e d - t a k e o f f  (RTO)  d e c i s i o n  making, t r a i n i n g ,  p rocedures ,  and a c c i d e n t  s t a -  
t i s t i c s .  A l though  t h e  NASA A i r c r a f t  A c c i d e n t  I n v e s t i g a t i o n  Board d i d  n o t  
f a u l t  t h e  c r e w ' s  a c t i o n ,  i t  was somewhat p e r p l e x e d  t h a t  an a i r c r a f t  c o u l d  be 
d e s t r o y e d  as a r e s u l t  o f  blown t i r e s  d u r i n g  t h e  t a k e o f f  r o l l .  To p r o v i d e  a 
b e t t e r  unders tand ing  o f  t i r e  f a i l u r e  R T O ' s ,  t h e  Board o b t a i n e d  a c c i d e n t  
r e p o r t s ,  Federa l  A v i a t i o n  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  ( F A A )  s t u d i e s ,  and o t h e r  p e r t i n e n t  
t h e  a n a l y s i s  p rocess  and conv inced t h e  A c c i d e n t  Board t h a t  high-speed R T O ' s  i n  
shou ld  be made aware o f  v a r i o u s  RTO s i t u a t i o n s  and s t a t i s t i c s  w i t h  emphasis on  
f a i l e d - t i r e  RTO's. T h i s  background i n f o r m a t i o n  c o u l d  enhance t h e  s p l i t - s e c o n d  
dec is ion-mak ing  process  t h a t  i s  r e q u i r e d  p r i o r  t o  i n i t i a t i n g  an RTO. 





I t r a n s p o r t  a i r c r a f t  s h o u l d  be g i v e n  more emphasis d u r i n g  p i l o t  t r a i n i n g .  P i l o t s  
ACCIDENT SYNOPSIS 
On J u l y  17, 1985, a t  1810 P . d . t . , '  NASA 712, a Conva i r  990 a i r c r a f t ,  was 
d e s t r o y e d  by  f i r e  a t  March A i r  Force Base, C a l i f o r n i a .  The f i r e  s t a r t e d  du r -  
i n g  t h e  i n t e n t i o n a l  extended r o l l o u t  a f t e r  t h e  p i l o t  r e j e c t e d  t h e  t a k e o f f  on  
runway 32 (13,300 f e e t  l o n g ) .  The r e j e c t e d  t a k e o f f  was i n i t i a t e d  d u r i n g  t h e  
t a k e o f f  r o l l  because o f  blown t i r e s  on  t h e  r i g h t  main l a n d i n g  g e a r .  D u r i n g  
t h e  ex tended r o l l o u t ,  f ragments  of e i t h e r  t h e  blown t i r e s  or t h e  whee l /b rake  
assembl ies  p e n e t r a t e d  a r ' g h t - w i n g  f u e l  t a n k  f o r w a r d  o f  t h e  r i g h t  ma in  l a n d i n g  
g e a r .  Leak ing  f u e l  i g n i t e d  w h i l e  the a i r c r a f t  was r o l l i n g ,  and f i r e  e n g u l f e d  
t h e  r i g h t  w ing  and f u s e l a g e  a f t e r  the  a i r c r a f t  was s topped on  t h e  runway. The 
4-man f l i g h t c r e w  and t h e  15 s c i e n t i s t s  and t e c h n i c i a n s  sea ted  i n  t h e  c a b i n  
evacuated  t h e  a i r c r a f t  w i t h o u t  s e r i o u s  i n j u r y .  The f i r e  was n o t  e x t i n g u i s h e d  
by  c r a s h / f i r e / r e s c u e  e f fo r ts  and the a i r c r a f t  was d e s t r o y e d .  
The NASA A i r c r a f t  A c c i d e n t  I n v e s t i g a t i o n  Board de te rm ined  t h a t  t h e  proba-  
b l e  cause o f  t h e  a c c i d e n t  was t h e  n e a r l y  s imu l taneous  f a i l u r e  o f  t h e  two f r o n t  
t i r e s  on  t h e  r i g h t  main l a n d i n g  gear a t  a c r i t i c a l  t i m e  d u r i n g  t h e  t a k e o f f  
r o l l .  These f a i l u r e s  r e s u l t e d  i n  the p i l o t ' s  d e c i s i o n  t o  r e j e c t  t h e  t a k e o f f .  
C o n t r i b u t i n g  t o  t h e  s e v e r i t y  o f  the  a c c i d e n t  was an i n t e n s e  f i r e  f e d  by l e a k -  
age from t h e  punc tu re  o f  a r i g h t - w i n g  f u e l  t ank  f o r w a r d  o f  t h e  r i g h t  main 
gear ;  t h e  p u n c t u r e  o c c u r r e d  d u r i n g  t h e  i n t e n t i o n a l  ex tended r o l l o u t  o f  t h e  
a i r c r a f t .  
l A l l  t imes  a r e  P a c i f i c  d a y l i g h t  sav ings  t i m e  based on  t h e  24-hour c lock.  
HISTORY OF THE FLIGHT 
As the aircraft accelerated, the pilot heard two rapid explosive bangs 
l and immediately felt a "kind of quivering of the aircraft." These sounds were 
recorded on the cockpit voice recorder (CVR). The flightcrew recognized the 
sound as a blown tire. The pilot, in the right seat, recalled seeing the air- 
speed indicator pass 140 knots. The flight engineer recalled "seeing a speed 
of 135 to 140 knots." Several technicians in the cabin were in the habit of 
monitoring and cross-checking inertial ground speed readouts, and they 
recalled a reading of 144 knots at the time of the explosions. The flight 
data recorder (FDR) indicated that 143 knots was the maximum speed attained. 
~ 
The aircraft was dispatched at a ramp weight of 232,500 lb (240,000 lb 
ramp weight limit). On the basis of the atmospheric conditions at the time of 
takeoff, the crew had calculated a decision speed Vi of 151 knots, a rota- 
tion speed VR of 154 knots, and an initial climb speed V2 of 167 knots. 
The balanced-field length was calculated to be 10,500 feet, 2,800 feet less 
than the actual length of March Air Force Base runway 32 (13,300 feet). 
The flightcrew stated that everything was normal in the cockpit during 
the first part of the takeoff roll. However, the occupants of the cabin and 
several witnesses outside the aircraft noted abnormalities. A technician, 
watching a television monitor linked to a camera focused on tire 3 (fig. l), 
noticed deformation of the tire early in the takeoff roll before the tire blew 
out. Another technician occupying a right-side cabin seat aft of the wing had 
a fleeting perception of a "black object flying over the wing." An outside 
witness made a similar comment. Other witnesses, who were positioned about 
2 miles from the aircraft, noticed white smoke coming from the aircraft under- 
side early in the takeoff roll. There was no indication of these abnormali- 
ties in the cockpit, nor did the cabin occupants relay their observations to 
the fl ightcrew. 
Nine seconds after the first explosions, another bang was heard by the 
flightcrew and recorded on the CVR. The flight engineer stated "blew another 
one." Five seconds later the CVR recorded the application of reverse thrust, 
14 seconds after the first tire blew out. As reverse thrust was being 
applied, another bang was recorded on the CVR but was not noticed by the 
flightcrew. 
side the tires had blown but, based on the sound, thought that they were on 
the left side. 
During the rollout the pilot stated that he was not sure on which 
The pilot reduced reverse thrust on all engines after the flight engineer 
called "3000" (meaning 3000 ft remaining), as recorded on the CVR. Approaching 
the end of the runway and without knowledge of a fire, the pilot started a 
2 
e 
r i g h t  t u r n  toward  t h e  l a s t  t a x i w a y  i n  an a t t e m p t  t o  c l e a r  t h e  runway. A f t e r  
h e a r i n g  a c a l l  o f  " f i r e  on  t h e  r i g h t  s i d e "  from t h e  t e c h n i c i a n s  i n  t h e  
c a b i n  a r e a ,  t he  p i l o t  immed ia te l y  b rough t  t h e  a i r c r a f t  to  a s t o p  a t  about  
12,700 f e e t .  
d l e s .  The a i r c r a f t  commander r e l e a s e d  h i s  s e a t b e l t  and s h o u l d e r  harness  and 
opened t h e  r i g h t  c o c k p i t  window to  assess t h e  s i t u a t i o n .  He no ted  f i r e  near 
t h e  r i g h t  main l a n d i n g  gear and raw fue l  p o u r i n g  o u t  o f  t h e  w ing  i n  f r o n t  of 
t h a t  gea r  and immed ia te l y  o r d e r e d  t h e  f l i g h t c r e w  t o  evacuate  t h e  a i r c r a f t .  
The eng ines  were s h u t  down by u s i n g  t h e  emergency shutdown han- 
ACCIDENT SEQUENCE ANALYSIS 
To a s s i s t  t h e  A c c i d e n t  Board i n  a n a l y z i n g  t h e  sequence o f  t h e  a i r c r a f t  
a c c i d e n t  even ts ,  a runway e v e n t  r e c o n s t r u c t i o n  was diagrammed ( f i g .  2 ) .  T h i s  
was accompl ished by i d e n t i f y i n g  t h e  d e b r i s  and i t s  l o c a t i o n  on t h e  runway, 
a l o n g  w i t h  marks made on t h e  runway s u r f a c e  p r i m a r i l y  by  t h e  t i r e  and wheel 
assembl ies  of t h e  r i g h t  main l a n d i n g  gear .  From t h i s  and o t h e r  f a c t u a l  d a t a ,  
t h e  f o l l o w i n g  a c c i d e n t  sequence a n a l y s i s  was made. 
,-,> I\.- t h e  aircraft t a x i e d  cntc! r u n ~ a y  32,  i t  left a. d i s t i n c t i v e  w h i t e  t r a c k  
( f i g .  3 ) .  The a i r c r a f t  t i r e s  scrubbed b l a c k  j e t  eng ine  exhaus t  d e p o s i t s  off  
t h e  c o n c r e t e  runway s u r f a c e  d u r i n g  the t u r n  o n t o  t h e  runway. 
marks faded away as t h e  a i r c r a f t  e n t e r e d  t h e  moderate-to-heavy rubber -  
con tamina ted  a r e a  near  t h e  runway c e n t e r l i n e  a t  about  700 f e e t . 2  
t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  t i r e  t r e a d  was u n i f o r m ,  showing no ev idence  o f  l o s t  i n f l a t i o n  
p r e s s u r e  or o t h e r  t i r e  a b n o r m a l i t y .  
b l y  would n o t  be d e t e c t e d  on  t h e  runway or t a x i w a y  s u r f a c e ,  b u t  subsequent 
h e a t  e f f e c t s  would have o c c u r r e d  i n  the t i r e  body. The f i r s t  t i r e  rubber  
shards were found  a t  about  1,400 f e e t  on t h e  r i g h t  s i d e  o f  t h e  c e n t e r l i n e  near 
t h e  a r r e s t i n g  gear c a b l e .  A t  2,200 f e e t  and about  1 1  f e e t  r i g h t  o f  t h e  c e n t e r -  
l i n e ,  f r e s h  s q u i g g l y  r u b b e r  marks were f o u n d  on  t h e  rubber -coa ted  c o n c r e t e  su r -  
f a c e  i n  l i n e  w i t h  t h e  e s t i m a t e d  p o s i t i o n  o f  t i r e s  3 and 7 ( f i g .  1 ) .  These 
wavy i n t e r m i t t e n t  r u b b e r  marks, v i s i b l e  f o r  about  400 f e e t  ( f i g .  41, were l a t e r  
a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  t i r e  3 by t r e a d  d e b r i s  found  nearby .  A l l  o f  t h e  t i r e  fragments 
c o l l e c t e d  on t h e  runway between 1,300 and 4,000 f e e t  were l a t e r  i d e n t i f i e d  
w i t h  t i r e  3 .  The t i r e  3 r e t r e a d  cap ( f i g .  5 > ,  most o f  wh ich  was recove red ,  
showed no hea t  e f f e c t s .  I n s p e c t i o n  o f  t h e  wheel b e a r i n g s  on  t h e  r i g h t  main 
l a n d i n g  gear ,  w i t h  p a r t i c u l a r  emphasis on  b e a r i n g s  3 and 4, r e v e a l e d  no  abnor- 
m a l i t i e s .  An i n s p e c t i o n  o f  t h e  brakes, a l t h o u g h  n o t  c o n c l u s i v e  because of 
f i r e  damage, showed no ev idence o f  d ragg ing .  T h e r e f o r e  i t  was conc luded t h a t  
t h e  main gear t i r e s  were p r o p e r l y  i n f l a t e d  and t h a t  t h e  b r a k e  systems were n o r -  
mal d u r i n g  t h e  i n i t i a l  t a k e o f f  a c c e l e r a t i o n  r o l l .  
These w h i t e  t i r e  
The w i d t h  o f  
L i g h t  or even moderate b rake  d r a g  proba- 
Rubber marks were found  on  t h e  runway s u r f a c e  a t  4,125 and 4,138 f e e t ,  
i n d i c a t i n g  where t i r e  4 and t h e n  t ire 3 b lew  o u t .  
dua l  nose wheels and e i g h t  main gear t i r e s  mounted on two four -whee l  t r u c k s .  
Each main gear t r u c k  has two a x l e s ,  one f o r e  and one a f t  o f  t h e  l a n d i n g  gear 
s t r u t .  The des ign  a l l o w s  v e r t i c a l  bu t  n o t  l a t e r a l  p i v o t i n g  o f  t h e  t r u c k .  Con- 
s e q u e n t l y ,  a f a i l u r e  o f  one o f  t h e  t i r e s  r e s u l t s  i n  t h a t  l o a d  b e i n g  s h i f t e d  to  
t h e  r e m a i n i n g  t i r e  on t h e  same a x l e .  
The CV-990 a i r c r a f t  has 
2 A 1 1  r e f e r e n c e s  t o  runway 32 d i s tances  a r e  i n  f e e t  s t a r t i n g  a t  t h e  
a p p r o a c h / t a k e o f f  end (0  f t )  and p r o g r e s s i n g  t o  t h e  d e p a r t u r e  end (13,300 f t ) .  
3 
The a n a l y s i s  o f  t i r e  and wheel marks on t h e  runway i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  t h e  
f a i l u r e  sequence began when t h e  t r e a d  from t h e  t i r e  3 s t a r t e d  coming a p a r t  a t  
about  1,400 f e e t .  The f a i l i n g  t i r e  3 caused t i r e  4 ( b o t h  on t h e  same a x l e )  t o  
r u n  i n  an over loaded c o n d i t i o n .  T h i s  c o n t i n u e d  u n t i l  t h e  4 ,125- foo t  mark,  
when t i r e  4 b lew,  f o l l o w e d  0.05 second l a t e r  by t h e  b l o w o u t  o f  t h e  t i r e  3 c a r -  
cass a t  4,138 f e e t .  
ca ted  t h a t  extreme h e a t  had b u i l t  up i n  t i r e  4, c o n t r i b u t i n g  t o  i t s  f a i l u r e .  
Fragments o f  t i r e s  3 and 4 were s c a t t e r e d  o v e r  a l a r g e  p o r t i o n  o f  t h e  runway 
s u r f a c e  between 4,000 and 5,200 f e e t .  The d r a g  r e s u l t i n g  from t h e  t i r e  f a i l -  
u res  caused t h e  a i r c r a f t  t o  swerve s l i g h t l y  t o  t h e  r i g h t .  Marks on  t h e  runway 
i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  the  swerve began w i t h i n  300 f e e t  ( l e s s  t h a n  2 seconds) o f  t h e  
f i r s t  two t i r e  b lowouts .  There were no  v i s i b l e  i n d i c a t i o n s  o f  l e f t  main gear  
wheel b r a k i n g  t o  c o r r e c t  f o r  t h i s  swerve and, i n  f a c t ,  t h e  p i l o t  s t a t e d  t h a t  
he was " g o i n g  t o  s tay  off t h e  b r a k e s . "  The a c t i o n s  t a k e n  by  t h e  p i l o t ,  a f t e r  
t h e  f i r s t  t i r e  b lowouts ,  were t o  c l o s e  t h e  t h r o t t l e s  ( t h e  CVR i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  
t h e  t h r o t t l e s  were c l o s e d  w i t h i n  4 seconds of these  b l o w o u t s ) ,  t o  d e p l o y  t h e  
s p o i l e r s ,  and t o  c o r r e c t  f o r  a s l i g h t  r i g h t  swerve. There was no  runway e v i -  
dence o f  wheel b r a k i n g  from e i t h e r  t h e  f u l l y  o p e r a t i o n a l  l e f t  main gear  or t h e  
f a i l i n g  r i g h t  main gear  d u r i n g  t h e  e n t i r e  r o l l o u t .  
The p o s t a c c i d e n t  e x a m i n a t i o n  of t h e  t i r e  f ragmen ts  i n d i -  
Wi th  t h e  f a i l u r e  of t i r e s  3 and 4 on t h e  r i g h t  t r u c k ,  v i s i b l e  sco re  marks 
( f i g .  6 > ,  s t a r t i n g  a t  about  4,175 f e e t ,  showed where t h e  number 3 and 4 f r a n g i -  
b l e  aluminum wheels c o n t a c t e d  t h e  runway. The r i g h t  s i d e  o f  t h e  a i r c r a f t  was 
now suppor ted  by t i r e s  7 and 8 and wheel r i m s  3 and 4 .  The a i r c r a f t  began 
r i d i n g  i n t e r m i t t e n t l y  on wheel r i m s  3 and 4 from t h e  4 ,175- foo t  p o i n t ,  s i n c e  
most o f  t h e  rubber  o f  t i r e s  3 and 4 ( e x c e p t  fo r  t h e  bead bund les )  q u i c k l y  
abraded. Wheel f ragments from wheels 3 and 4 were f o u n d  on t h e  runway s t a r t -  
i n g  a t  about  5,600 f e e t ,  t h e  p o i n t  a t  wh ich  t h e  r i m s  s t a r t e d  b r e a k i n g  up, 
s c a t t e r i n g  f ragments i n  a l l  d i r e c t i o n s .  A f r agmen t  from wheel 4 i s  shown i n  
f i g u r e  7 .  
t i r e s .  Rubber marks on t h e  runway s u r f a c e  a t  6,190 f e e t  i n d i c a t e d  where t i r e  
8 b lew o u t .  From CVR i n f o r m a t i o n  t h i s  o c c u r r e d  9 seconds a f t e r  t i r e  4 b lew  
o u t ,  The f l i g h t c r e w  p e r c e i v e d  t h i s  as t h e  second t i r e  f a i l u r e .  S c u f f  marks 
on t h e  runway su r face  a t  7,300 f e e t  ( f i g .  8 )  i n d i c a t e d  where t i r e  7 b lew o u t ,  
and t h e  sound was r e c o r d e d  on  t h e  CVR. However, t he  f l i g h t c r e w  s t a t e d  t h a t  
t h e y  d i d  n o t  hear  t h e  b lowou t  as i t  was masked by  t h e  sounds o f  eng ine  spoo lup  
as r e v e r s e  t h r u s t  was b e i n g  a p p l i e d  12 seconds a f t e r  t h e  " a b o r t "  c a l l o u t .  A 
l a r g e  number o f  t i r e  rubber  and wheel f ragmen ts  were f o u n d  s c a t t e r e d  o v e r  t h e  
runway from 7,100 to  8,400 f e e t  ( f i g .  9 ) .  
These fragments may have c o n t r i b u t e d  t o  t h e  f a i l u r e  o f  t h e  two r e a r  
From w i t n e s s  t e s t i m o n y  i t  i s  suspec ted  t h a t  t h e  w ing  was p u n c t u r e d  a f t e r  
f a i l u r e  o f  t h e  number 3 and 4 r i m  and wheel assemb l ies ,  somewhere between 
6,000 and 7,000 f e e t  from t h e  t a k e o f f  end o f  t h e  runway. Wheel s c u f f  marks on 
t h e  runway s u r f a c e  a t  8,000 f e e t  i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  wheels 3 and 4 were worn down 
t o  t h e  hub (w ide  marks) b u t  t h a t  wheels 7 and 8 were s t i l l  r o l l i n g  on  t h e  r i m s  
(two nar row marks f o r  each whee l ) .  The s c u f f i n g  on t h e  runway o f  t h e  t i r e  rem- 
nan ts  and bead bundles and t h e  f a i l u r e  o f  t i r e s  7 and 8 p r o b a b l y  caused an a l -  
most con t inuous  t r a i l  of w h i t e  smoke t o  be e m i t t e d  from t h e  u n d e r s i d e  o f  t h e  
a i r c r a f t .  However, i t  was n o t  u n t i l  a f t e r  7,000 f e e t  t h a t  o u t s i d e  w i tnesses  
d e s c r i b e d  i n t e r m i t t e n t  f l a s h e s  o f  f i r e  around t h e  r i g h t  main g e a r .  
nesses saw f l ames  coming from under t h e  r i g h t  w ing  f l a p s  a t  10,000 f e e t  and 
passed t h i s  i n f o r m a t i o n  t o  t h e  f l i g h t c r e w .  
runway - scorched, d i s c o l o r e d  c o n c r e t e  s u r f a c e  - was a t  11,950 f e e t .  
were i n  l i n e  w i t h  t h e  t r a c k s  o f  t h e  r i g h t  main gear  wheels.  The scorched su r -  
face marks p e r s i s t e d  down t h e  runway t o  t h e  a i r c r a f t  s t o p  p o i n t  a t  12,660 f e e t  
I n s i d e  w i t -  
The f i r s t  ev idence  o f  f i r e  on t h e  
The marks 
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( f i g s .  10 and 1 1 ) .  
t o  a s t o p .  S h o r t l y  t h e r e a f t e r  t h e  a i r c r a f t  was e n g u l f e d  i n  f l ames  ( f i g s .  1 2  
and 13) .  
t e r  ( f i g .  14) and a t  v a r i o u s  ground l o c a t i o n s  ( f i g s .  15 and 16 ) .  
The a i r c r a f t  was i m m e d i a t e l y  evacuated  a f t e r  i t  was b r o u g h t  
The a i r c r a f t  wreckage on the runway was photographed from a h e l i c o p -  
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 
A f t e r  s t u d y i n g  t h e  runway even t  sequence and t o  h e l p  t h e  A c c i d e n t  Board 
unders tand  t h e  p i l o t ' s  d e c i s i o n ,  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  i n f o r m a t i o n  was ga the red  and 
used t o  a s s i s t  t h e  3 o a r d ' s  a n a l y s i s  and assessment of  t h i s  a c c i d e n t .  T h i s  
i n f o r m a t i o n  focuses  on t h e  f requency  o f  blown t i r e  R T O ' s  as w e l l  as t h e  t r a i n -  
i n g  requ i remen ts .  
RTO A c c i d e n t i I n c i d e n t  I n f o r m a t i o n  
I n  1977 a Federa l  A v i a t i o n  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  r e p o r t 3  c o v e r i n g  171 R T O ' s  from 
1964 to  1975 conc luded t h a t  87 pe rcen t  had r e s u l t e d  from some f a i l u r e  or mal- 
f u n c t i o n  o f  t i r e s ,  wheels,  or brakes  - 74 p e r c e n t  from t i r e s  a l o n e .  The d a t a  
r e v e a l e d  t h a t  eng ine  f a i l u r e s  have no t  been t h e  dominant  causa l  f a c t o r  f o r  
some t i m e .  The A c c i d e n t  Board c o l l e c t e d  d a t a  on  RTO a c c i d e n t s  and i n c i d e n t s  
s i n c e  1975, when t h e  FAA s t u d y  ended, t o  de te rm ine  i f  t h e s e  t r e n d s  c o n t i n u e d .  
S i x t y - o n e  a c c i d e n t l i n c i d e n t  r e c o r d s  c o v e r i n g  January  1976 t o  September 1985 
were i d e n t i f i e d  from N a t i o n a l  T r a n s p o r t a t i o n  S a f e t y  Board, FAA, B r i t i s h  C i v i  1 
A v i a t i o n  A u t h o r i t y ,  and NASA A v i a t i o n  S a f e t y  R e p o r t i n g  System sources .  The 
dominant cause, a c c o u n t i n g  f o r  34 pe rcen t  o f  t h e  documented cases, was t i r e /  
wheel f a i l u r e .  The second most dominant cause, a c c o u n t i n g  f o r  23 p e r c e n t ,  was 
eng ine  f a i l u r e  or m a l f u n c t i o n .  
i n g  43 p e r c e n t  o f  t h e  cases .  Hence the  t r e n d  appears t o  be c o n t i n u i n g  t h a t  
eng ine  f a i l u r e s  a r e  n o t  t h e  p r i m a r y  cause o f  a i r c r a f t  r e j e c t e d - t a k e o f f  
a c c i d e n t s / i n c i d e n t s .  
A v a r i e t y  o f  f a c t o r s  c o n t r i b u t e d  t o  t h e  remain- 
A d d i t i o n a l  i n f o r m a t i o n  from t h e  Douglas A i r c r a f t  Company on  a l i m i t e d  
number o f  DC-10 t i r e - r e l a t e d  a c c i d e n t s l i n c i d e n t s  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  a i r c r a f t  
damage and i n j u r y  r a t e s  a r e  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  h i g h e r  if a p i l o t  r e j e c t s  r a t h e r  
than  c o n t i n u e s  t a k e o f f  when f a c e d  w i t h  t i r e  m a l f u n c t i o n  a t  speeds near  t h e  c a l -  
c u l a t e d  d e c i s i o n  speed V i  for t h e  a i r c r a f t  g ross  w e i g h t ,  a tmospher ic  c o n d i -  
t i o n s ,  and f i e l d  e l e v a t i o n .  
P i l o t  T r a i n i n g  f o r  R e j e c t e d  T a k e o f f s  
S t a t i s t i c s  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  R T O ' s  i n  response t o  t i r e  problems a r e  four t i m e s  
more l i k e l y  t o  r e s u l t  i n  an a c c i d e n t  or i n c i d e n t  t han  those  i n  response t o  
eng ine  prob lems.  However, i n  genera l ,  RTO t r a i n i n g  i s  p r e d i c a t e d  on an eng ine  
f a i l u r e  be fore  r e a c h i n g  V i .  A t  t h e  p r e s e n t  t i m e ,  t h e r e  i s  no  r e q u i r e m e n t  t o  
f a m i l i a r i z e  p i l o t s  w i t h  o t h e r  anomalies such as b lown t i r e s  t h a t  c o u l d  demand 
an RTO. I n  f a c t ,  appendix E ( F l i g h t  T r a i n i n g  Requ i rements )  o f  14 CFR 121 
3 J e t  T r a n s p o r t  R e j e c t e d  Takeof fs ,  F i n a l  Repor t ,  Feb rua ry  1977, F1 i g h t  
S tandards  S e r v i c e ,  Federa l  A v i a t i o n  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n .  
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s t a t e s  o n l y  t h a t  air c a r r i e r  f l i g h t c r e w s  must r e c e i v e  t a k e o f f  t r a i n i n g  w i t h  a 
s i m u l a t e d  f a i l u r e  o f  t h e  most c r i t i c a l  eng ine  d u r i n g  i n i t i a l ,  t r a n s i t i o n ,  and 
upgraded t r a i n i n g .  T h i s  may be accompl ished i n  a v i s u a l  s i m u l a t o r  and does 
n o t  address RTO t r a i n i n g  f o r  o t h e r  reasons .  
A su rvey ,  as of October  1985, of 16 a i r  c a r r i e r  f l i g h t  t r a i n i n g  s i m u l a t o r  
f a c i l i t i e s  i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  t h e r e  were 76 s i m u l a t o r s  i n  o p e r a t i o n  t h a t  met FAA 
Phase I 1  or Phase 111 r e q u i r e m e n t s .  These s i m u l a t o r s  can p r e s e n t  f a i l e d - t i r e  
models w i t h  v a r y i n g  degrees o f  r e a l i s m .  D i s c u s s i o n s  w i t h  t r a i n i n g  pe rsonne l  
from some o f  t h e  major a i r  c a r r i e r s  d i d  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  p i l o t s  a r e  exposed t o  
s i m u l a t e d  f a i l e d - t i r e  a i r c r a f t  o p e r a t i o n s  o n l y  d u r i n g  t r a n s i t i o n  t r a i n i n g  from 
one t y p e  o f  a i r c r a f t  t o  ano the r  and n o t  d u r i n g  r e g u l a r  c u r r e n c y  t r a i n i n g .  
a d d i t i o n ,  t r a i n i n g  pe rsonne l  s t a t e d  t h a t  p rocedures  f o r  RTO's have been s tand-  
a r d i z e d .  These procedures a re  genera l  and do n o t  address  s p e c i f i c  a c t i o n s ,  
c a u t i o n s ,  or hazards ( i . e . ,  d i r e c t i o n a l  c o n t r o l ,  b rake  f a i l u r e ,  r i m  f a i l u r e ,  
a n t i s k i d  anomal ies,  e t c . )  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  RTO's a f t e r  b lown t i r e s .  The consen- 
sus o f  t h e  procedures i s  t h a t  once a d e c i s i o n  t o  a b o r t  has been made t h e  f o l -  
l o w i n g  s teps  should be taken :  
I n  
( 1 )  Se t  t h r o t t l e s  t o  i d l e  and s i m u l t a n e o u s l y  depress  b rake  p e d a l s  f u l l y .  
( 2 )  M a i n t a i n  d i r e c t i o n a l  c o n t r o l .  
(3) Extend spo i le rs .  
( 4 )  R e v e r s e  t h r u s t .  
( 5 )  Pu t  fo rward  p r e s s u r e  (as  r e q u i r e d )  on  c o n t r o l  column. 
( 6 )  M a i n t a i n  maximum b r a k i n g  u n t i l  a i r c r a f t  s t o p s .  
The a i r  c a r r i e r s '  t r a i n i n g  p h i l o s o p h y  i s  t h a t  t h e  RTO p rocedure  does n o t  
change t o  m e e t  d i f f e r e n t  emergency s i t u a t i o n s .  The r a t i o n a l e  i s  t h a t  h a v i n g  
one p rocedure  for  a l l  s i t u a t i o n s  makes i t  e a s i e r  t o  t r a i n  f l i g h t c r e w s  and may 
s i g n i f i c a n t l y  r e d u c e  f l i g h t c r e w  r e a c t i o n  t i m e  t o  an emergency. 
S ince  s t a t i s t i c s  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  most RTO's r e s u l t  from t i r e  f a i l u r e s  and 
t h a t  s i m u l a t o r s  e x i s t  t h a t  can model f a i l e d  t i r e s  w i t h  v a r y i n g  degrees o f  r e a l -  
i s m ,  i t  f o l l o w s  t h a t  r e a l i s t i c  s i m u l a t o r  t r a i n i n g  shou ld  be r e q u i r e d .  The s i m -  
u l a t o r  model should be programmed w i t h  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  t o  s i m u l a t e  t h e  e f f e c t s  
o f  b r a k i n g  w i t h  a b lown t i r e  or  t i r e s ,  b r a k i n g  w i t h  p a r t  o f  t h e  t r u c k  r o l l i n g  
on t h e  r i m s ,  t h e  i n t e r a c t i o n s  o f  b lown t i r e s  and a n t i s k i d  b r a k i n g ,  d i r e c t i o n a l  
c o n t r o l  p rob lems,  t h e  b r a k i n g  e f f o r t  r e q u i r e d  f o r  maximum e f f e c t i v e n e s s ,  and 
t h e  hazards assoc ia ted  w i t h  high-speed RTO's on  f r a n g i b l e  r i m s .  
REJECTED-TAKEOFF ANALYSIS 
T h i s  s e c t i o n  addresses t h e  p i l o t ' s  dec i s ion -mak ing  process  and t h e  p r e s e n t  
d e c i s i o n  speed c r i t e r i a .  
D e c i s i o n  Making 
I n  g e n e r a l ,  t h e  p i l o t ' s  dec i s ion -mak ing  p rocess  r e q u i r e s  two k i n d s  o f  
i n f o r m a t i o n ,  c u r r e n t  and background, and t h i s  i n f o r m a t i o n  must be i n t e g r a t e d  
and a c t e d  on i n  seconds. P i l o t s  shou ld  be aware t h a t  t h e  need f o r  an RTO can 
o c c u r  on e v e r y  takeoff and shou ld  a n t i c i p a t e  t h e  problems t h a t  may t r i g g e r  
one. The RTO i s  one o f  t h e  most demanding maneuvers f o r  a f l i g h t c r e w  t o  
i 
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p e r f o r m ,  e s p e c i a l l y  if conducted i n  a heavy a i r c r a f t  a t  or near  VI, as 
o c c u r r e d  i n  t h i s  a c c i d e n t .  These s i t u a t i o n s  may r e q u i r e  a p i l o t  t o  e x e r c i s e  
s k i l l  and to  make i n s t a n t  d e c i s i o n s  a t  t h e  l i m i t s  o f  h i s / h e r  knowledge and 
t r a i n i n g .  S ince  i t  i s  i m p o s s i b l e  t o  p r e d i c t ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  a p o s s i b l e  t i r e  
f a i l u r e  on  a heavy, high-speed t a k e o f f ,  knowledge about  v a r i o u s  t ypes  o f  s i t u a -  
t i o n s ,  when p r o p e r l y  a p p l i e d ,  can a l l e v i a t e  t h e  need t o  r e l y  e n t i r e l y  on  
s k i l l .  
has,  t h e  f a s t e r  and more a c c u r a t e  t h e  dec i s ion -mak ing  process  can be. 
O b v i o u s l y  i n  any s i t u a t i o n  the more background i n f o r m a t i o n  a p i l o t  
The most c r i t i c a l  e lement  o f  the a c c i d e n t  was t h e  p i l o t ' s  response t o  t h e  
f i r s t  t i r e  f a i l u r e s ,  wh ich  o c c u r r e d  j u s t  be fo re  t h e  a i r c r a f t  reached VI. A t  
t h e  f a i l u r e  moment t h e  p i l o t  had two o p t i o n s :  t o  c o n t i n u e  t h e  t a k e o f f  or t o  
r e j e c t  i t .  The o p t i o n  t o  c o n t i n u e  the t a k e o f f  was a v i a b l e  p o s s i b i l i t y ,  s i n c e  
a c t u a l  runway l e n g t h  was 2,800 f e e t  l o n g e r  t h a n  b a l a n c e d - f i e l d  l e n g t h  and a l l  
eng ines  were o p e r a t i n g  n o r m a l l y .  I n  f a c t ,  s t a t i s t i c s  have shown t h a t  a i r c r a f t  
t h a t  exper ience  blown t i r e s  on  t a k e o f f ,  c o n t i n u e  t h e  t a k e o f f ,  and l a n d  a f t e r  
d e c r e a s i n g  t h e  a i r c r a f t  g ross  we igh t  have i n c u r r e d  much l e s s  damage t h a n  those  
i n v o l v e d  i n  R T O ' s .  Fur thermore  t h e  same s t a t i s t i c s  show t h e r e  have been no 
i n j u r i e s  i n v o l v e d  i n  those ins tances  where t h e  t a k e o f f  was con t inued ,  b u t  t h e r e  
i f  t h e  a i r c r a f t  had taken  o f f  s u c c e s s f u l l y ,  i t  would have a v e r t e d  a high-speed, 
heavyweigh t  RTO. However, c o n t i n u i n g  the  t a k e o f f  would have i n v o l v e d  o t h e r  
f a c t o r s  and p i l o t  d e c i s i o n s  i n  o rde r  t o  maneuver and c o n f i g u r e  t h e  a i r c r a f t  t o  
s u c c e s s f u l l y  t e r m i n a t e  t h e  f l i g h t .  One cannot  say c o n c l u s i v e l y  t h a t  c o n t i n u -  
i n g  t h e  t a k e o f f  would have been a b e t t e r  o p t i o n ,  o n l y  t h a t  s t a t i s t i c s  i n d i c a t e  
t h a t  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  f o r  a s u c c e s s f u l  outcome c o u l d  have been g r e a t e r .  
h-.... h e e m  E - C - I : C ~ A ~  ~ l a v r  uccii I a L a i i L i c a  2nd i n j ~ ~ i e s  i f i  RTO a c c i d e n t s .  In t h i s  a c c i d e n t ,  
I n  t h i s  a c c i d e n t ,  once t h e  p i l o t  made t h e  d e c i s i o n  t o  r e j e c t  t h e  t a k e o f f ,  
he had two o p t i o n s :  ( 1 )  maximum d e c e l e r a t i o n  t o  s t o p  t h e  a i r c r a f t  as soon as 
p o s s i b l e ,  or ( 2 )  l e s s  than  maximum d e c e l e r a t i o n  e x t e n d i n g  t h e  r o l l o u t .  The 
p i l o t  d i d  r e a c t  p r o m p t l y  t o  t h e  t i re  f a i l u r e s  and i n  accordance w i t h  t h e  a i r -  
c r a f t  f l i g h t  manua l ' s  RTO procedures ,  w i th  t h e  e x c e p t i o n  of b r a k i n g .  The p i l o t  
s t a t e d  t h a t  he i n t e n d e d  t o  use l i g h t  b r a k i n g  because o f  t h e  runway l e n g t h ,  
d i r e c t i o n a l  c o n t r o l  problems, and h i s  concern  w i t h  f a i l u r e  o f  a d d i t i o n a l  t i r e s .  
These f a c t o r s  a l o n g  w i t h  p r i o r  knowledge and exper ience  i n f l u e n c e d  t h e  p i l o t ' s  
d e c i s i o n  n o t  t o  immed ia te l y  s t o p  the a i r c r a f t ,  b u t  to  l e t  i t  g r a d u a l l y  d e c e l e r -  
a t e .  The accepted  i n d u s t r y  procedure d i c t a t e s  t h a t  once an a b o r t  d e c i s i o n  has 
been made, maximum b r a k i n g  s h o u l d  be a p p l i e d  immed ia te l y  for t h e  most e f f i -  
c i e n t  d e c e l e r a t i o n ,  and i t  s h o u l d  be h e l d  u n t i l  t h e  a i r c r a f t  s tops  w h i l e  a l s o  
m a i n t a i n i n g  d i r e c t i o n a l  c o n t r o l .  The reasons f o r  t h i s  p rocedure  i n c l u d e  t h e  
f o l l o w i n g :  
( 1 )  
( 2 )  
(3) 
p u n c t u r e  
(4) 
( 5 )  
I n  
P o s s i b l e  p u n c t u r e  o f  w ing  f u e l  t anks  i s  m in im ized .  
Wheel b r a k i n q  i s  most e f f e c t i v e  w h i l e  t i r e s  a r e  on t h e  wheel r i m s .  
The r i s k  o f  a d d i t i o n a l  f a i l u r e ,  i n c l u d i n g  b r a k e l i n e  r u p t u r e  
Onboard personne l  can evacuate sooner .  
A i r c r a f t  a r e  b u i l t  and c e r t i f i e d  t o  endure b rake  f i r e s .  
or r i m  f a i l u r e ,  i s  m in imized.  
i g h t  o f  t h e  v a r i o u s  o p t i o n s  t h a t  were a v a i l a b l e  i n  t h i s  acc 
f u s e  1 age 
d e n t ,  i t  
i s  o b v i o u s - t h a t  a f r e s h  look shou ld  be g i v e n  t o  RTO t r a i n i n g  and p rocedures .  
A l l  p i l o t s  shou ld  be made aware of a c c i d e n t j i n c i d e n t  s t a t i s t i c s  w i t h  p a r t i c u -  
l a r  emphasis on f a i l e d - t i r e  RTO's. The n e c e s s i t y  f o r  maximum d e c e l e r a t i o n  i n  
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response to an RTO decision should be emphasized. 
conducted to evaluate completing the takeoff versus the RTO. 
Further studies should be 
Decision Speed Criteria 
Traditionally, the basic RTO guideline has been to reject the takeoff if 
any problem is recognized before 
is recognized at or after Vi. Since Vi speed is the go/no-90 decision speed 
in the event of an engine failure, pilots have come to regard Vi as the 
go/no-go decision speed for any recognized anomaly during the takeoff roll 
regardless of other favorable factors. Some of these factors were present in 
this accident, that is, all engines were operative and the runway was longer 
than required for a balanced field. Both of these factors allowed for the 
option to take off as discussed earlier. 
V1 and to continue the takeoff if a problem 
Training of pilots to respond with one procedure, cued solely by Vi 
speed, for all RTO situations is based on several principles. First, it may 
be preferable to keep an aircraft with a problem on the ground rather than to 
take it into the air. Second, there is the innate difficulty of evaluating 
anomalies and deciding on alternative actions while acceleratiqg at high 
speed. Third, it is a well-documented training principle that training for a 
single response to any emergency strengthens the automatic, uniform, expedi- 
tious response of the entire flightcrew in a unified action. These reasons 
are understandable but given the statistics and the finding that more RTO's 
are caused by tire failures than engine failures, the RTO criterion should be 
reviewed. Perhaps the decision to reject takeoff should be based on an 
increasing level of criticality as the aircraft approaches Vi. One considera- 
tion could be that when takeoff speeds are between 20 knots below Vi and 
V I ,  only an engine failure could cause the initiation of an RTO. Tire fail- 
ures and other less serious anomalies would not automatically prompt an RTO. 
This would address a situation where tire problems manifest themselves just 
before or at V I ,  compromising the aircraft's capability to stop within the 
remaining available runway. If the takeoff would be continued, the damaged 
tire system would neither be subjected to the full weight (without some aerody- 
namic lifting) of an aircraft loaded for takeoff nor to the stress of a high- 
speed, maximum-braking-effort RTO. It may be that the only high-speed tire 
failure that would require an RTO would be one that had caused major engine 
degradation. This accident is a good example of where better decision speed 
criteria and more background information regarding R T O ' s  would have been valua- 
ble to the pilots to enhance their knowledge and decision-making capability. 
In this accident, it is conceivable that this could have altered the pilot's 
decision, allowing for a more favorable outcome. 
LESSON LEARNED 
This accident had a unique element that is rarely found in rejected-take- 
off accidents. That is, the runway was 2,800 feet longer than the calculated 
balanced-field length. This element allowed the crew to select one of three 
options at the instant the first two tires failed: 
(1 )  Allow the aircraft to roll out with little or no braking. 
( 2 )  Maximum brake the aircraft to a stop. 
( 3 )  Continue the takeoff. 
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A 
I t  i s   are i n  RTo a c c i d e n t s  t h a t  t h e  opt ion to  a l l o w  t h e  a i r c r a f t  t o  r o l l  
o u t  w i t h  l i t t l e  or no b r a k i n g  i s  a v a i l a b l e .  Most o p e r a t i o n s  i n v o l v i n g  t h i s  
t y p e  o f  a i r c r a f t  a r e  conducted  o n  runways where t h e  b a l a n c e d - f i e l d  l e n g t h  i s  
n e a r l y  t h e  same as t h e  a c t u a l  f i e l d  l e n g t h .  I t  i s  somewhat o b v i o u s  from t h e  
a n a l y s i s  o f  t h i s  a c c i d e n t  t h a t  if a heavy a i r c r a f t  i s  a l l o w e d  to  r o l l  a t  h i g h  
speeds on  f r a n g i b l e  r i m s ,  t h e r e  i s  a h i g h  p r o b a b i l i t y  t h a t  a w ing  f u e l  t a n k  
w i l l  be punc tu red ,  a r u n n i n g  f u e l  f i r e  w i l l  o c c u r ,  and t h e  a i r c r a f t  w i l l  be 
d e s t r o y e d .  
The second o p t i o n  t o  maximum brake t h e  a i r c r a f t  t o  a s t o p  once an RTO i s  
I t  i s  r e c o g n i z e d  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  o t h e r  
i n i t i a t e d  r e g a r d l e s s  o f  runway l e n g t h  i s  t h e  p r e f e r r e d  a i r l i n e  p rocedure .  
T h i s  m i n i m i z e s  t h e  w ing  f u e l  t a n k  punc tu re  p o s s i b i l i t y  by s l o w i n g  down t h e  
wheel r o t a t i o n  as q u i c k l y  as p o s s i b l e .  
f a c t o r s  i n v o l v e d  i n  t h i s  p rocedure  t h a t  must be cons ide red ;  however, t h e  
chance for  more f a v o r a b l e  RTO r e s u l t s  i s  r e l a t i v e l y  good. 
The t h i r d  o p t i o n  of c o n t i n u i n g  t h e  takeo f f  has a s s o c i a t e d  r i s k s  t h a t  have 
t o  be cons ide red .  However, i n  t h i s  a c c i d e n t ,  a l l  eng ines  were o p e r a t i v e  and 
t h e r e  was s u f f i c i e n t  runway t o  c o n t i n u e  t h e  t a k e o f f .  C o n t i n u i n g  t h e  t a k e o f f  
c o u l d  have r e s u l t e d  i n  a l i g h t w e i g h t  l a n d i n g  w i t h  c r a s h / f i r e / r e s c u e  equipment 
s t a n d i n g  by .  S t a t i s t i c s  do i n d i c a t e  t h a t  t h i s  o p t i o n  has a good success r a t e .  
I t  appears c l e a r  from t h e  a n a l y s i s  of t h i s  a c c i d e n t  t h a t  t h e  i n d u s t r y  as 
a whole needs t o  address RTO's w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  blown t i r e s .  P i l o t s  must be 
i n f o r m e d  o f  t h e  hazards and r i sks  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  b l o w n - t i r e  RTO's. 
shou ld  r e c e i v e  r e a l i s t i c  s i m u l a t o r  t r a i n i n g  w i t h  emphasis on  f a i l e d - t i r e  RTO 
prob lems.  T h i s  i s  necessary  t o  p r o v i d e  p i l o t s  w i t h  a b e t t e r  s i t u a t i o n  aware- 
ness, wh ich  can enhance t h e i r  dec is ion-mak ing  process  and make them b e t t e r  
r i s k  managers. 
They 
Given t h a t  s t a t i s t i c s  show t h a t  eng ine  f a i l u r e s  a r e  no  l o n g e r  t h e  predomi- 
n a n t  cause for RTO's, a c t i o n  should be taken  t o  change t h e  a n t i q u a t e d  RTO d e c i -  
s i o n  speed V1 c r i t e r i o n ,  s i n c e  i t  i s  based s o l e l y  on  eng ine  f a i l u r e .  
B I  B L I OGRAP HY 
B a t t h a u e r ,  Byron E. ,  e t  a l . :  A i r c r a f t  A c c i d e n t  Repor t :  NASA 712, C o n v a i r  990, 
N712NA, March A i r  Force Base, C a l i f o r n i a ,  J u l y  17, 1985. Vol. I - E x e c u t i v e  
Summary. Vol. I 1  - Fac ts  and A n a l y s i s .  NASA TM-87356, 1986. 
F igu re  1. - Posi t ions of t i re and  wheel  assemblies on CV-990 m a i n  
l and ing  gear. 
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Distance along runway, f t  
1. ooo 2, ooo 0 
,-Wheel 3 fragment 
Tireltread carcass fragments Y 
,Runway centerl ine 
Engine spooldown audible on CVR -_ - _____ --“5~--J% secafter in i t ia l  t i re  fai lureJ7 
Speed. 80knots ; -w_&-___-__ I - - 
I ,_,-Engine reverse spoolup audible on CVR ------- - - - - - L-Z- 
\ I F x L T i r e  7 blowout (speed, 
1 118 knots; see f ig 11) 
‘Wheels 7 and 8 r i m  flanges 





Start of scorch marks on 7- ____-- ---- 
pavement (see figs. 12and 131J I t I 
\ Taxiways 3 a n d  4 vu 4 5 - 7  
Taxiway 
(b) 68CG-ft mark to end of runway 32. 
Figure 2. - Reconstruction of NASA 712 accident. Total runway width, 300 f t  with 75-ft concrete surface in center and 112.5-ft asphalt on  
both sides. 
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(a) On runway  32 looking back toward taxiway 1. 
Nose gear 
unwav shoulder oai nt str ipe 
(b) Near runway shoulder at taxiway 1 looking toward runway  32. 
Figure 3. - Suspected wh i te  t i r e  sc rub  marks produced d u r i n g  turn onto runway  32 at taxiway 1. 
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Figure 4. - Tire 3 rubber marks found on surface 2,200 ft from threshold of runway 32. 
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(a) Tire 3 - left front 
(c )  Tire 7 - left rear. 
(b)  Tire 4 - r ight  front. 
Id)Tire 8 - r ight  rear. 
Figure 5. - Assembled fragments of r iqht  main qear tires from NASA 712, found on runway 32 at Msrch Air Force Base, California. 
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Figure 6. - Wheel f lange r i m  marks and debris f r o m  t i res  3 and 4 at approximately 4,188 f t  f r o m  runway  32 
threshold. 
I 
Figure 7. - Fragment of wheel 4 f ound  6,300 f t  f r o m  runway  32 threshold.  
Figure 8. - Runway surface rubber marks f r o m  blowout of t i r e  7. 
15 
16 
la )  Found between 6, COO and  7, OM) ft down r u n w a y  32. 
,. I . 
Ibl Found near l y  7, 200 l t  d w n  r u n w a y  32 
I C )  Found  between 10,000 and  11, OM) I t  down r u n w a y  32. 
Figure 9. - Some addi t ional  f raarnents of r i q h t  ma ln  gear whee l i b rake  assembly found at va r ious  locat ions on 
runway .  
Figure 10. - Runway surface scorch marks and t i r e  rubber debris f r o m  r i g h t  main gear at about 11,950 f t  down 
runway  32. 
Figure 11. - Aerial  view of fire-damaged NASA 712 at stop point, 12,660 ft down runway  32. 
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'*c- N O W  gear 
(see f i g  161 
of fire-damaged NASA 712takei i  at f ron t  UI hre:kaqe 
Wheel 2 
Figure 16. - Closeup view of right main  gear wheels after f ire. 
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